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Abstract 
 
Advocates of the Efficient Market Hypothesis argue that markets are rational and 
stock prices fully reflect all available information. It is therefore not surprising that 
the magnitude of corporate disclosure is generally endorsed for the reason that 
within market-based economies accounting information is assumed to be essential 
for the functioning and retaining of an efficient capital market. From an agency 
perspective this means that capital providers utilize accounting information  for 
stewardship and valuation purposes. However, in presence of an information 
asymmetry, one can argue that the traditional financial reporting mechanism seems 
to fail in providing relevant, decision-useful information regarding true value- 
creation. Hence, it is the discrepancy of information between a principal (capital 
provider) and agent (manager) that can lead to potential undervaluation and 
overvaluation of respectively highly and poorly profitable investments. Stated 
differently, the ‘lemons problem’ could lead to an inefficient capital market or even 
market failure. 
The deficiencies of the traditional financial reporting  mechanism force 
organizations to broaden out and open up their corporate reporting activities, 
integrating financial information and non-financial information (ESG) into one 
single comprehensive report. For the reason that both forms of information are 
perceived value-relevant, one can argue that disclosing financial and non-financial 
information in a complementary manner enables capital providers to valuate 
investment opportunities more effectively (valuation role) and to monitor the use of 
invested capital more intensively (stewardship role). After all, an integrated report 
should bound the information asymmetry as it provides capital providers with 
insight on how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects 
lead to value-creation on the short, medium and long term. Thus, if the information 
in an integrated report supports capital providers in making more effective capital 
allocation decisions, one expects that capital providers positively value 
organizations that intend to adopt Integrated Reporting. 
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To analyse the extent to which capital providers value Integrated Reporting, two 
event studies are performed. For the first event study that includes 58 publicly listed 
organizations that participated in the pilot of the International Integrated Reporting 
Council (IIRC), the analysis comprises the calculation of cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over three time-windows. Additionally, the analysis deepens the 
comprehensibility of the CAR’s by controlling for multiple organization-specific 
factors. Succeeding the first event study and to be able to compare the value of 
Integrated Reporting with the value of Annual Reporting and standalone 
Sustainability Reporting, the second event study includes 105 publicly listed 
organizations that have published an annual report, a standalone sustainability report 
and integrated report consecutively (data are retrieved from IIRC database and GRI 
database). The cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the publication of the 
organization’s first integrated report are compared to those surrounding the 
publication of the two other reporting mechanisms. 
The empirical results do not support the general proposition of this study, 
specifying that organizations that have the intention to adopt Integrated Reporting do 
not significantly outperform the market as a whole. Additionally, the results do not 
provide significant evidence that the issuance of an integrated report in relation to an 
annual report and standalone sustainability report further increases an organization’s 
market capitalization substantially. These results allow to conclude that Integrated 
Reporting is not valued superiorly by the stock market and that the ‘One report’ has 
“not fulfilled its promise quantitatively”. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Agency   theory,   Integrated   Reporting,   event,   cumulative 
abnormal returns, organization-specific variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
– Study background – 
 
The presented master thesis is written within the field of capital market based accounting. By 
combining schools of thought on accounting and corporate finance the main objective of this thesis 
is to assess the extent to which Integrated Reporting is valued by the stock market. This 
introductory chapter consists of several sections that provide background information with regard 
to the study of interest. First, the problem indication and problem statement are set forth. Second, 
an elaboration on the methodology for the literature study is provided (the methodology for the 
empirical analysis is provided in chapter 3), followed by information related to the structure of the 
thesis. 
 
 
1.1 Problem indication and problem statement 
 
With regard to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (hereafter: EMH), which assumes that markets are rational and 
prices of stocks fully reflect all available information (Jensen, 1978; Latif, Arshad, Fatima, & Farooq, 2012; 
Orlitzky, 2013), it is generally recognized that within market-based economies accounting information in terms 
of corporate disclosure is essential for the functioning of an efficient capital market (hereafter: stock market) 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Hoogendoorn & Vergoossen, 2012: Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). By means of 
regulated financial reports, the entity reporting allows capital providers to value investment opportunities 
(valuation role of accounting information, ex-ante) and to monitor the use of their invested capital (stewardship 
role of accounting information, ex-post) (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010). The demand for accounting 
information though no longer solely relates to financial disclosure (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Tschopp & 
Nastanski, 2014; Lodhia, 2014; Tilt, 1994). Although capital providers utilize the regulated financial reports for 
valuation and stewardship purposes and thereby justify agency theory from a financial point of view, the demand 
for reporting non-financial information increased over the last decade (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; 
O'Donovan, 2002). Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), Tschopp and Nastanski (2014) and Higgins, Stubbs, and Love 
(2014) even state that with regard to disclosure, the institutionalized agency perspective no longer holds as the 
leading paradigm, indicating a shift towards legitimacy and stakeholder theory. 
Regardless  of  the  main  difference  between  these  social-political  theories
1
,  both  suggest  that 
 
organizations should account for a broader range of interests in order to obtain legitimacy and to be able to create 
long term value (Jensen, 2002; Rankin, Stanton, McGowan, Ferlauto, & Tilling, 2012; Magness, 2006). Thus, as 
implied by the growing demand for non-financial accounting information, merely reporting financial accounting 
information is no longer sufficient in order to obtain legitimacy (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). Therefore, from a 
capital provider’s perspective one can conclude that providing non-financial information became a necessity for 
legitimacy purposes, and thereby contributes to the safeguarding of the continuity of organizations. In addition to 
legitimacy purposes, disclosing information regarding Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues can 
affect for example: 1) reputational aspects, 2) long term sales (Siltaoja, 2006), and even 3) the cost of equity 
capital as presented by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Cheung (2011). While taking into account that disclosure on 
ESG issues can indeed affect financial aspects of an organization (Arnold, Bassen, & Frank, 2012 referring to 
 
1  Legitimacy theory views organizations from a society perspective, stakeholder theory takes an individualistic 
approach (Rankin et al., 2012). 
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Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), the information on social responsibility 
should, at least in a rational and efficient stock market, be valued by capital providers. 
Bearing in mind that financial and non-financial information both hold significant value for capital 
providers (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Tschopp & Nastanski, 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011), simultaneously 
providing capital providers with both forms of information by means of a comprehensive disclosure should 
create a “value enhancing effect” (Petersen & Plenborg, 2006 referring to Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Although 
this rationale is not unequivocally supported empirically (Arnold et al.; 2012; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2015; 
Stubbs, Higgins, Milne, & Hems, 2014), one can argue that disclosing financial and non-financial information in 
a complementary manner enables capital providers to valuate investment opportunities more effectively and to 
monitor the use of invested capital more intensively (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & Palepu, 1993; Petersen & 
Plenborg, 2006). After all, an integrated report should provide capital providers with insights on how an 
organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead 
to value creation on the short, medium and long term (IIRC, 2015a; Barton, 2011). Thus, following Dhaliwal et 
al. (2011) and Cheung (2011), providing information on how ESG aspects are incorporated into an 
organization’s business (organization’s  philosophy towards sustainability) should  support capital providers 
making more effective capital allocation decisions (IIRC, 2015a; Arnold et al., 2012; Barton, 2011). 
Taking the rationale of the aforementioned value enhancing effect into account, one can argue that in an 
efficient stock market where all available information is reflected in stock prices (Jensen, 1978; Latif et al. 
2012), a single disclosure containing financial and non-financial information should be valued by capital 
providers (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Therefore, in absence of a consensus on 
the market value of Integrated Reporting, the presented research assesses the rationale by means of empirically 
testing the extent to which Integrated Reporting is valued by the stock market. In other words: To what extend 
does the stock market value Integrated Reporting? In consideration of the aforementioned problem statement, 
several more manageable questions are derived as follows: 
 Question 1: What can, according to the literature, be considered as Integrated Reporting? 
 
 Question 2: What is, according to the literature, the role of accounting information in the stock market? 
 
 Question 3: How does the stock market react to Integrated Reporting? 
 
Each question corresponds to a separate paragraph in the subsequent chapter. Whereas the answer to question 
one and two provides theoretical background on Integrated Reporting and the role of accounting information in 
the stock market (paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2), the answer to question three relates to the theoretical market reaction 
following organizations making an announcement on Integrated Reporting (paragraph 2.3). Note that in 
paragraph 2.3 hypotheses are developed. 
 
 
1.2 Methodology (literature study) 
 
With reference to the literature study, relevant literature is sought first by performing a citation analysis (Sekaran 
 
& Bougie, 2010). While searching for well-known work and/or highly praised articles, the snowball method 
complements the citation analysis in order to be able to obtain more articles related to the subject of study (using 
the key document containing citations and/or references to other sources related to the subject of study) (see also 
figure 1 for the structure of the literature review) (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). To ensure the quality of the 
literature study, articles relevant to the subject of study are extracted from A-quality journals in the field of 
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finance and accounting (capital market based accounting: voluntary and mandatory disclosure and stock market 
response). To assess this quality, the impact factor of the journals and articles is verified. 
Google Scholar is used as it provides a reliable method of obtaining information regarding the use and 
importance of a specific article. In addition of using Google Scholar other databases such as ProQuest, 
ScienceDirect, Emerald Insight, and the OU library are used to obtain relevant articles. Although the intention is 
to use recent articles, older articles will be included if providing relevant insights on the relation(s) of interest. 
Given that non-financial reporting and Integrated Reporting are well spoken subjects it is therefore expected that 
a wide spectrum of information is available. Note that the elaboration on the methodology for the empirical 
analyses follows in chapter three. 
 
Field of interest 
 
 
Existing literature review(s) Citation analysis 
 
Snowball method 
 
Paper 1 
 
 
Grouping 
Paper 2 Paper 3 
 
 
Grouping 
Paper n 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the structure of the literature review 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis follows a pre-set structure. Whereas in chapter two the sub questions are addressed 
theoretically and hypotheses are formulated, chapter three explains the data collection and the methods used for 
the analyses. Chapter four in turn provides the results of the analyses, followed by the fifth chapter in which an 
answer is given to the problem statement. This closing chapter will also contain the discussion on the study’s 
limitations. 
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2. Theoretical background 
 
– Integrated Reporting and the role of accounting information – 
 
Advocates of Integrated Reporting (e.g. Eccles & Kiron, 2012; Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Tschopp & 
Nastanski, 2014; Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2013; Fasan, 2013) 
generally argue that a single disclosure containing financial and non-financial information will (or 
must) become the next standard in corporate reporting (regardless of the standard by which 
organizations report - GRI’s G3, AA1000, UNGC COP, ISO26000). To be able to comprehend the 
rationale underlying the proposed magnitude of Integrated Reporting and the extent to which it is 
valued by the stock market respectively, it is necessary to define Integrated Reporting and to study 
the relevance (role) of the concept for the stock market. The current chapter provides 
understanding with regard to the latter by elaborating on Integrated Reporting (sub question 1, 
paragraph 2.1) and its relevance for the stock market (sub question 2, paragraph 2.2). In paragraph 
2.3 the reaction of the stock market in relation to Integrated Reporting is hypothesized (sub 
question 3). 
 
 
2.1 Integrated Reporting 
 
As generally recognized by academics and practitioners (Eccles, Cheng, & Saltzman, 2010; Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2015; Tschopp & Nastanski, 2014; KPMG, 2013) the arena of corporate reporting was largely dominated by 
financial disclosure (e.g. financial statements). However, there have been increasing concerns regarding this 
form of corporate reporting as it seems to be insufficient in meeting the information needs of various 
stakeholders (Lee & Yeo, 2015; Cheng, Green, Conradie, Konishi, & Romi, 2014; Latif et al., 2012; Healy & 
Palepu, 1993; 2001; Eccles et al., 2010; Hutton, 2004; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). Where the school of thought 
of amongst others Lee and Yeo (2015) and Cheng et al. (2014) in essence relates to the well-known stakeholder 
versus shareholder debate, their rationale supports the institutionalization of stakeholder theory as argued by 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) and Higgins, Stubbs, and Love (2014). Thus, from a stakeholders’ perspective, the 
traditional financial reporting model fails in providing relevant, decision useful information about true value- 
creation and therefore forces organizations to broaden out and opening up their corporate reporting activities 
(Lee & Yeo, 2015; Brown & Dillard, 2014; Haller & Staden, 2014; IIRC, 2011). In response to the need for 
broadening out and opening up corporate reporting activities, Cheng et al. (2014), referring to Cohen, Holder- 
Webb, Nath, and Wood (2012), argue that organizations have attempted to complement financial disclosure with 
non-financial information. While non-financial information typically refers to Environmental, Social, and 
Governance aspects
2 
(Eccles & Serafeim, 2013; Eccles & Kiron, 2012; Eccles et al., 2010; Mervelskemper & 
Streit, 2015; Bassen & Kovacs, 2008), the mechanisms often used to report on ESG issues generally comprise 
Corporate Social Responsibility reports, standalone sustainability reports or an incorporation within the annual 
report (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2014; Arnold et al., 2012). Although one can argue that such 
mechanisms support meeting the differentiated information needs (de Villiers, Rinaldi, & Unerman, 2014), Lee 
and Yeo (2015) and Cheng et al. (2014) suggest that organizations do not provide financial and non-financial 
 
 
2 
Some define ESG issues as extra-financial information as it  enables capital providers to better assess risks and opportunities 
(Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). 
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information in an integrated manner. Arnold et al. (2012) refer to this misalignment as a disconnection between 
ESG information on the one hand and financial information on the other hand. As such, the information 
usefulness and thereby stakeholder understanding of the organization is diminished (Arnold et al., 2012; Lee & 
Yeo, 2015). 
To provide a solution to the problem of misalignment of financial and non-financial information, a clear 
link between the two information forms needs to be established (Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Eccles et al., 2010). 
Where the clear link refers to a new reporting mechanism (i.e. integrated report, often referred to as “One 
Report”) Eccles and Krzus (2010) allude to a combination of financial and narrative information with non- 
financial (ESG) and narrative information. However, from a holistic and integrated perspective that Integrated 
Reporting requires (Reuter & Messner, 2015), the definition of Eccles and Krzus (2010) is quite narrow and 
assumes that organizations provide both forms of disclosure. Integrated Reporting however, is not solely an 
amalgamation of financial and non-financial information, it is much broader as it requires organizations to report 
on value, the value creation process and the business model (Roth, 2014; Dzinkowski, 2015; Cheng et al., 2014). 
Therefore, following the much broader definition of the International Integrated Reporting Council (2011; 2013) 
(hereafter: IIRC): 
Integrated Reporting brings together the material information about an organization’s  strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects in a way that reflects the commercial, social, and environmental context within 
which it operates. It provides a clear and concise representation of how it creates value, now and in the 
future. Integrated Reporting combines the most material  elements of information currently reported in 
separate reporting strands (financial, management commentary, governance and remuneration, and 
sustainability) in a coherent whole and importantly shows the connectivity between them and explains how 
they affect the ability of an organization to create and sustain value in the short, medium, and long term. (pp. 
6-8) 
The comprehensive definition of the IIRC stems from the fundament that organizations should broaden out and 
open up reporting activities by including all resources used in relation to its business activit ies (Haller & Staden, 
2014; Brown & Dillard, 2014). Where resources are defined as capitals by the IIRC
3 
an integrated report should 
encompass how the business model and strategy integrate with the capitals identified. Especially the latter will 
be beneficial relative to the traditional financial reporting model as it responds to demands for more forward 
looking information through considering (the realization of) short, medium and long-term business objectives 
(IIRC, 2011; 2013; Eccles & Kiron, 2012; Eccles et al., 2010). 
 
 
2.2 Role of accounting information – Agency based 
 
With reference to the notion that an organization is seen as a holistic vehicle for creating value, now and in the 
future (IIRC, 2013; Reuter & Messner, 2015; Roth, 2014; Dzinkowski, 2015; Cheng et al., 2014), Integrated 
Reporting is a mechanism by which organizations provide information concerning value-creation. Information 
though in itself is material by nature (Eccles et al., 2010; Deegan & Rankin, 1997) and thus, if omissions or 
misstatements could influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the accounting information 
 
 
3 
The IIRC (IIRC, 2013) identified the capitals: Financial, Manufactured, Intellectual, Human, Social and Relationship, Natural. 
 
Please see “Consultation draft of the international Integrated Reporting framework” pp. 11 for an explanation. 
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provided (i.e. materiality), one must be able to answer amongst others why organizations report and why 
information is perceived relevant? (Eccles et al., 2010; Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). 
Whereas Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), Tschopp and Nastanski (2014) and Higgins et al. (2014) argue 
that agency theory is no longer the leading paradigm in the context of corporate reporting, one must 
acknowledge that this positive, economic theory can provide a valid and solid explanation of why disclosure is 
relevant for capital providers and thus, why organizations (are obliged to) disclose (Rankin et al., 2012; Beyer et 
al., 2010). Namely, agency theory perceives an organization as a nexus of contracts, explaining relations 
whereby, according to Rankin et al. (2012), “a person or group of persons (the principal) employs the services of 
another (the agent) to perform some activity on their behalf” (p. 135). As this implies separation of ownership 
and control of the organization (Bevir, 2012), it denotes principals (hereafter: capital providers) not having full 
decision-making rights (Oh, Chang, & Martynov, 2011). By no longer being positioned as having the mandate to 
control the organization, capital providers contractually bound agents for the reason that the agents do not always 
act in their best interests (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & Palepu, 1993; Rankin et al., 2012; Oh et al., 2011). To 
eliminate this principal-agent problem that stems from the governance structure, capital providers utilize 
accounting information ex-post to assess the agent’s compliance of the contract (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Bushman & Smith, 2001). In addition to this stewardship role, the demand for accounting 
information augments as capital providers want to evaluate the return potential of investment opportunities 
(valuation role of accounting information) (Beyer et al., 2010). Given that it is generally recognized that agents 
(managers) have more information with respect to the profitability of current and future investments relative to 
outsiders (capital providers), it becomes difficult for the latter to make ex-ante a fully informed assessment of the 
attractiveness of investment opportunities (Beyer et al., 2010 referring to Akerlof, 1970; Petersen & Plenborg, 
2006; Graham et al., 2005). In other words, and following Beyer et al. (2010), if capital providers are unable to 
assess the potential return of investment opportunities, it is highly likely that they will under-value highly 
profitable investments and over-value poorly profitable investments. Hence, this “lemons problem” that arises 
from information asymmetry in turn can lead to an inefficient market/ market failure (Healy & Palepu, 2001; 
Jensen, 1978; Petersen & Plenborg, 2006; Hoogendoorn & Vergoossen, 2012). 
By emphasizing the importance of accounting information in relation to market efficiency, it indicates 
that financial as well as non-financial information both need to contribute in lowering the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015; Carroll & Shabana, 2010). As 
recognized however, the traditional financial reporting model fails in providing relevant, decision useful 
information (Lee & Yeo, 2015; Brown & Dillard, 2014; Haller & Staden, 2014). However, Cheng et al. (2014) 
and Luo et al. (2015) stress that non-financial information in particular can contribute in lowering the 
information asymmetry; that is, when non-financial information complements the traditional financial 
disclosures. Accordingly, Carroll and Shabana (2010) and among others Siltaoja (2006) and Menguc and Ozanne 
(2005) argue that disclosure on ESG aspects provide capital providers with valuable insight on cost and risk 
reduction. To illustrate, Siltaoja (2006) finds that social responsibility affects long term sales, Menguc and 
Ozanne (2005) report that environmental oriented-business can positively affect profit after tax and an 
organization’s market share and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) even argue that social responsibility positively affects the 
cost of equity capital. Thus, by disclosing non-financial information in addition to financial information, the 
information asymmetry should be lowered (Carrol & Shabana, 2010; Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al., 2010). 
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2.3 Stock market reaction 
 
Defined as a mechanism by which an organization should be able to promulgate in a clear and concise manner 
how it creates value on the short, medium, and long-term, proponents assert that Integrated Reporting has certain 
potential benefits (Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al., 2010; Stubbs & Higgins, 2014; Higgins et al., 2014; IIRC, 
2013). Though empirical evidence is rather scarce, Lee and Yeo (2015) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) argue in 
accordance with the definition provided by the IIRC (2011; 2013), that some of the asserted potential benefits of 
Integrated Reporting include 1) a better understanding of an organizations’ strategy and how its business model 
responds to the external environment and competition, 2) a better understanding of risks and opportunities that 
may affect the organization’s ability to create value in the short, medium, and long term, 3) a better 
understanding of how the organization mitigates risks and creates value from attractable opportunities and the 
governance structure needed to support value creation, 4) the complementary character of having both financial 
and non-financial information, meeting relevant stakeholders’ needs, 5) a focus on connectivity of information 
and explains for example how the organization links its strategy to the external environment, 6) a need to have 
more connected departments in order to produce a good integrated report and to benefit from this improvement 
in internal processes, 7) a lower cost of equity capital. Based on this improved understanding of the 
interconnectedness of the organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects relative to its 
commercial, social, and environmental context (ESG aspects are incorporated into an organization’s business), 
one can argue that an integrated report presumably diminishes the “principal-agent problem” and the “lemons 
problem” that stems from information asymmetry (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & Palepu, 1993) and in turn allows 
capital providers to make more effective capital allocation decisions that facilitate better long-term investment 
returns (IIRC, 2015a; Lee & Yeo, 2015). Thus, taking the proposed benefits into account, in a rational and 
efficient capital market where all available information is reflected in stock prices (Jensen, 1978; Latif et al., 
2012), it is expected that Integrated Reporting is valued by capital providers. Therefore, it is predicted that: 
 
 
◤    Hypothesis 1 (H1): Integrated Reporting is valued positively by the stock market 
 
 
Yet, empirical findings of Mervelskemper and Streit (2015) and Arnold et al. (2012) contrast the findings of Lee 
and Yeo (2015), providing no evidence that issuance of an integrated report instead of a separate sustainability 
report further increases capital providers’ valuation of the organizations’ stock (market value of the 
organization). I.e. “if a firm already publishes a separate sustainability report (ESG), there is no incentive to 
immediately switch to Integrated Reporting as its expected benefits cannot be documented yet” (Mervelskemper 
& Streit, 2015, p.20). The results presented by Mervelskemper and Streit (2015) appear to support the 
information economics perspective, stating that identical information content leads to identical valuations, 
independent of the way in which the information is displayed. Rephrased, whether financial or non-financial 
information (ESG) is either presented by means of an integrated report or standalone sustainability report, the 
market reaction does not differ as long as the information provided is identical (Mervelskemper & Streit , 2015; 
Arnold et al., 2012). However, from a behavioural finance perspective there appears to be a particular concern 
with regard to the rationality of information economics. That is, the central tenet of information economics 
assumes that users of accounting information process all relevant information rationally. Others such as Barberis 
and Thaler (2003) Rankin et al. (2012) and Orlitzky (2013) point out that users of accounting information are 
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subject to anchoring and adjustment bias. Accordingly, Barberis and Thaler (2003) note that it is highly likely 
that when capital providers assess ESG information, they already have formed a judgment based on the available 
financial information. Arnold et al. (2012) theoretically underpin the potential presence of this bias, arguing that 
the separate character of financial and non-financial reports (disconnect between the two reports) may “lead 
users of financial information to anchor on their financial value assessments and as a consequence potentially 
under of overvalue non-financial information” (p. 3). Accordingly, an integrated report can, in terms of 
anchoring, be regarded as a mechanism for debiasing given that it provides the opportunity to assess financial 
and non-financial information simultaneously. Hence, by showing the connectivity between financial and non- 
financial information and explaining how its material elements affect the organization’s ability to create and 
sustain value, it is argued here that the simultaneity by which an integrated report provides financial and non- 
financial information is relevant for making more effective capital allocation decisions (IIRC, 2015a; Cheng et 
al., 2014; Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). Therefore, it is predicted that: 
 
 
◤ Hypothesis 2 (H2): Integrated Reporting is valued more by the stock market than standalone reporting 
(Sustainability Reporting and/ or Financial Reporting
4
) 
 
 
By testing the abovementioned hypotheses the study not only contributes to the current body of knowledge on 
the value relevance of Integrated Reporting for the stock market, it also provides insight on its value relative to 
that of standalone Sustainability Reporting and annual (financial) reports published by the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Financial Reporting (FR) refers to the Annual Report by which the organization provides financial information. 
5 
The stock market reaction is analysed over a certain time period for organizations meeting the sampling criteria. 
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3. Data and Methods 
 
– Exchange listed organizations – 
 
To be capable of testing the hypotheses formulated in the foregoing chapter, it is important to first 
operationalize the variables of interest (defining the variables into measurable factors). Prior to the 
elaboration of the operationalization of the criterion and explanatory variables, the data analysis 
and methodological implications, the chapter provides information regarding data used and the 
research methodology. 
 
 
3.1 Research methodology 
 
In the context of the type of research one first has to notice that the categories: exploratory, descriptive, 
explanatory (hypothesis testing), and policy-oriented research, are not mutually exclusive. It is a matter of 
emphasis (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010; Anonymous, 2015). Given the objective of the proposed study, the research 
can be portrayed as a descriptive study with elements of an explanatory and exploratory research design. That is, 
the study emphasises the descriptive character of the value relevance of Integrated Reporting for the stock 
market and seeks to explain potential market reactions surrounding the organization’s announcement on 
Integrated Reporting. Furthermore, the study explores the effects of multiple organization-specific factors 
relative to the cumulative abnormal returns. 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010) and Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) descriptive studies 
are well suited for research that desires to explain “What”. To be able to provide a comprehensive analysis on the 
value relevance of Integrated Reporting, deductive research is conducted. For the reason that deductive 
reasoning is key in the hypothetico-deductive method (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010), data are collected and analysed 
for the purpose of testing the literature based hypotheses (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). For testing the hypotheses, 
Snow and Thomas (1994) state that a quantitative study is best suited for supporting or rejecting hypotheses. 
Therefore, in the context of the hypotheses formulated, the quantitative methodology chosen comprises an event 
study (short-horizon) as it allows to assess the financial impact of (corporate) events/ phenomena (stock market 
response to a corporate event) (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 
 
3.2 Data collection 
For an elaboration on the time-series cross-sectional data
5 
collection, it must first be recognized that the 
character of the hypotheses is such that it does not allow to test these with one sample. Hence, for each 
hypothesis separate data are collected. 
 
 
3.2.1 Value relevance of Integrated Reporting 
 
In consideration of the first hypothesis, publicly listed organizations are regarded as the unit of analysis. To test 
the extent to which the stock market values Integrated Reporting, an organization is included in the sample if it 
has made an announcement with regard to adopting Integrated Reporting. Note that it is highly important to 
distinguish the announcement date from the actual publication date (the date at which the integrated report is 
published by the organization of interest). If the announcement date cannot be distinguished from the publication 
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Region Total  
Africa 286 
Asia 146 
Europe 299 
Latin America & the Caribbean 106 
Northern America 39 
Oceania 35 
Totals 911 
 
date, then the relation between an announcement and the stock market reaction can no longer be isolated as the 
market reaction then relates to either the concept of Integrated Reporting and/ or to the quality/ content of the 
report. Given that a first enquiry points to this concern, the sample comprises organizations that participated in 
the pilot program of the IIRC. The IIRC started a pilot program on Integrated Reporting in 2011 and finalized it 
at the end of 2013 (IIRC, 2015b; Cheng et al., 2014). At the start of the pilot in 2011 more than 40 organizations 
contributed to the purpose of the program, publicly announcing to favour Integrated Reporting. By the end of 
2013 the pilot contained 100 organizations (mainly European organizations), all with the intention to adopt 
Integrated Reporting and to contribute to setting the reporting standard (IIRC, 2015b; Cheng et al., 2014). Of the 
100 participating organizations, 62 could be identified as publicly listed on stock exchanges according to 
Reuters.com or Bloomberg.com which similarly has been found by Mervelskemper and Streit (2015) (see 
appendix A.I). Thus, for the 62 publicly listed organizations, the announcement date reflects the date at which 
the participant publicly disclosed joining the pilot program (several announcement dates can be derived as not all 
participants joined at the same time) (see appendix A.II for several examples). The announcement dates are 
derived from Integratedreporting.org, CRSwire.com or press releases made by the particular organization . For 
the reason of lack of clarity on several announcement dates, four publicly listed organizations are excluded from 
the final sample
6
. For the 58 remaining organizations included in the sample data are collected with regard to the 
 
stock prices and the stock market at which the organizations’ shares are traded. Data are collected from 
Finance.Yahoo.com, Bloomberg.com, Marketwatch.com, and Financialweb.com for the 11-day period from t = - 
5 days to t = +5 days where t represents the announcement date of the participating organization (1.276 data 
points). The time window of 11 days provides  a solid foundation for studying the relation  between the 
announcement on Integrated Reporting and the stock market reaction (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 
 
3.2.2 Value relevance of Integrated Reporting versus standalone reporting 
 
To test the second hypothesis, similar to the first hypothesis publicly listed organizations are considered as the 
unit of analysis. In contrast to the first sample, organizations must meet the requirement of having published an 
Annual (financial) Report and a standalone sustainability report prior to having published an integrated report. 
For the reason that the hypothesis is comparative by nature the publication date of the separate reports is 
considered as the event. Here, tAR comprises the organization’s publication date of its annual report, tSR reflects 
the  date  at  which  the  organization  published  a  standalone 
 
sustainability report and tIR = the date at which the organization 
has published an integrated report. The organizations of interest 
are derived from the GRI database (Sustainability Disclosure 
Database) and IIRC database on Integrated Reporting (Recognized 
reports database). Over a period 2010 - 2015 the selected 
databases account for 3.314 integrated reports, published by 1.547 
organizations globally (see appendix A.III). Approximately 59% 
(911) of the organizations having published an integrated report is 
publicly listed and scattered over 6 regions (see table 1). Admitted 
Table 1: number of listed organizations by 
region 
 
 
6 
MHI, Kirloskar Brothers Limited, Freund Corporation, and CPFL Energia are excluded from the sample. 
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that ideally one would include all regions in the sample and thereby 911 listed organizations, it must be 
acknowledged that this exceeds the scope and timeframe of the study. Therefore, the study focusses on Europe, 
the region that is represented strongest. Of the 299 listed organizations that have filed an integrated report, 105 
(36%) are included in the sample for the reason that these organizations provide clarity on having published an 
annual report and a standalone sustainability report that precede the publication of an integrated report (see 
appendix A.III). For the 105 organizations meeting the requirement stock price data and stock market data are 
collected from Yahoo.finance.com, Bloomberg.com, Marketwatch.com, and Financialweb.com. For each 
reporting mechanism data are collected for the 11-day period (6.930 data points). Thus, tAR, tSR, and tIR = -5 days to 
+5 days where t represents the publication date of the annual report, sustainability report or integrated report 
 
respe ctiv ely. 
 
 
3.3 Operationalization 
 
To simplify the concepts, a description follows on the variables included in the study. Whereas the measurement 
of the cumulative abnormal returns is similar for both event studies, the CAR’s obtained in the first event study 
are explored more in-depth by means of controlling for several organization-specific factors. Note that 
organization-specific factors are therefore interpreted as control variables. 
 
 
3.3.1 Measurement of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
Both hypotheses are tested by means of calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). By using the market 
model (CAPM based) instead of the constant mean return model, it is assumed that there is a stable linear 
relation between the market return and the stock return of an organization (MacKinlay, 1997). According to 
MacKinlay (1997) abnormal returns are excess returns calculated by subtracting the expected returns 
(estimations) from the actual returns of an organization relative to the stock market as a whole at t. When having 
obtained the abnormal returns over the 11-day event window, it is general practice to standardize these by its 
standard deviation (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The standardized abnormal returns can then be cumulated for 
each organization of interest. The (average) cumulative abnormal returns that result are analysed and either 
support or reject the hypotheses. 
 
 
3.3.2 Measurement of control variables 
 
Whereas the CAR’s are centralized in testing both hypothesis, the analysis for testing H1 is deepened by the 
inclusion of several organization-specific factors. Stated differently, in phase two of the first analysis several 
organization-specific factors are included in order to explore the extent to which these factors potentially 
influence the cumulative abnormal returns (see also figure 2). The control variables included are mentioned 
below. 
 
 
Market capitalization 
 
In presence of the influential work of Banz (1981), arguing that small cap organizations have higher risk 
adjusted returns, on average, than mid and large cap organizations, it is assumed that smaller organizations will 
present higher average cumulative abnormal returns. To control for the “size” effect presented by Banz (1981), 
market  capitalization  is  used  as  proxy  for  organizational  size  (Fama  &  French,  1995).  Hence,  market 
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capitalization reflects the total market value of all outstanding shares of the organization. It is this net value of 
year t-1 (year prior to having made the announcement) of the organization that is included in the study in order 
to explore the influence of market capitalization on the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement on adopting Integrated Reporting. The market capitalization (M_CAP) is measures by MC = n x p 
(€) where n represents the number of shares outstanding at price p. Here the current price reflects the share price 
at year-end (year of announcement -1). Based on the market capitalization obtained, organizations are 
categorized as “Large cap” (≥ € 10 billion), “Mid cap” (> € 2 billion to < € 10 billion), or “Small cap” (≤ € 2 
billion). 
 
 
CSR rating 
 
According to Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, and de Sousa Filho (2008) non-financial disclosure (CSR) has the 
power to evoke strong positive reactions among stakeholders and thus capital providers. Accordingly, Scalet and 
Kelly (2010) and Cho, Freedman, and Patten (2012) argue from  a more voluntary disclosure theoretical 
perspective that organizations appear to focus especially on disclosing positive CSR activities in conjunction 
with financial performance. Rephrased, when organizations emphasize positive CSR activities, Wanderley et al. 
(2008) suggest that this could lead to higher cumulative abnormal returns. Given the rationale by which it is 
argued that positive CSR activities can contribute to more positive market reactions, one can state that the height 
of an organization’s CSR rating (CSR_R) may influence the cumulative abnormal returns. I.e. as higher CSR 
ratings indicate more positive CSR activities, it is expected that cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of adopting Integrated Reporting will be more positive. To control for the influence of CSR 
activities Bu, Liu, Wagner, and Yu (2013) and Boerner (2012) are followed, obtaining CSR ratings from 
CSRhub.com. The CSR ratings provided by CSRhub.com are measured on an ordinal scale (0 - 100) and 
comprise a normalized and aggregated measure of the extent to which an organization is rated on aspects such as 
community, employees, environment, governance
7
. Based on the rating, an organization is assigned to one of 
four categories (1: score = < 60, 2: score = ≥ 60 to score = < 65, 3: score = ≥ 65 to score = < 70, 4: score = ≥ 70). 
 
 
CAR’s CAR’s 
M_CAP 
CSR_R 
Phase 1 (n = 58) Phase 2 (n = 58) 
CAR’s AR 
CAR’s SR 
CAR’s IR 
(n = 105) 
 
  Hypothesis 1  Hypothesis 2   
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the phasing of the analysis and variables included 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
The event study method supports assessing whether there is an “abnormal” stock price effect associated with the 
announcements mentioned (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; MacKinlay, 1997). Assuming that the abnormal returns 
reflect the stock market’s  reaction to the disclosure of new integrated information, one can, by determining the 
level of abnormal returns, infer the significance (value) of Integrated Reporting for the stock market generally 
 
7 
Please see http://www.csrhub.com/content/csrhub-ratings-methodology/ for the rating methodology. 
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and in relation to standalone reporting. Therefore, to find potential valuation effects abnormal returns are 
computed relative to the market as a whole. Following McWilliams and Siegel (1997), MacKinlay (1997) and 
Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) the market model expresses the rate of return on the share prices of firm i on 
day t as follows: 
Rit =   i +   iRmt +  it 
 
 
Rit reflects the rate of return on the share price of organization i on day t and Rmt reflects the rate of return on the 
market as a whole on day t (index return). i represents the intercept term and i the systematic risk of share i.  it 
can be regarded as the error term ( it = 0). When having computed the expected return on the stock, it is 
necessary to estimate the daily abnormal returns for organization i. The excess returns or abnormal returns (ARit) 
can be computed as the difference between the actual and expected returns (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). Therefore: 
ARit = Rit – (  i + biRmt) 
 
 
Note that  i (intercept) and bi (slope) are the ordinary least squares estimates obtained when regressing the returns 
of organization i on day t on the returns of the market over a period of 100 days (“historical clean period data”) 
prior to the event (pre-event, 100 days prior to t = -5, see also figure 2) (MacKinlay, 1997). To test if there was a 
positive significantly abnormal return (ARt-test) on the day of the event, the abnormal return is then divided by the 
standard error of the returns 100 days prior to the event (hence, 100 days prior to t = -5). That is: 
 
ARt-test = ARit / SERiRm (clean period) 
 
 
where SERiRm ( t = -50) represents the Standard Error of the 100 day returns prior to event window. After computed 
abnormal returns for organization i on day t and tested for its significance, cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) 
can be calculated. CAR for organization i over the 11-day period is expressed as: 
 
CAR = ∑
(  )                it 
Here, k is the number of days (according to the time window selected) for which the standardized abnormal 
returns for organization i are cumulated (in the above equation 11-day period)
8
. To test the second hypothesis the 
value of Integrated Reporting (VIR)  is computed relative to the value  of  standalone reporting.  Therefore, 
cumulative abnormal returns for organization i related to the publication of an integrated report (CARiIR, (k) t = -5 to t 
= +5) are compared to the cumulative abnormal returns for organization i related to the publication of a standalone 
 
sustainability report (CARiSR, (k) t = -5 to t = +5) and annual report (CARiAR, (k) t = -5 to t = +5): 
 
(  )             
- 
 itSR 
 
(  )              
IR     
  itIR  
- 
 
 
 
(  )              
    itFR 
 
 
8 
The study will also include a time window of t = -1 to t = +1. 
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3.5 Methodological implications 
 
The popularity of the event study method is based on the supposition that stock prices reflect the true value of 
the organization (MacKinlay, 1997). McWilliams and Siegel (1997) argue in this context that stock prices reflect 
the discounted value of all future cash flows and incorporate all relevant information (hence, the assumption 
underlying the Efficient Market Hypothesis). Thus, the proposed event study that focusses on stock price 
changes should measure the financial impact of the magnitude of Integrated Reporting for capital providers. 
However, the validity and reliability of the results heavily depend on a set of assumptions (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997 referring to Brown & Warner, 1985). According to MacKinlay (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) an event study relies on the following assumptions: 1) markets are efficient, 2) the event was 
unanticipated, 3) there were no confounding effects during the event window, and 4) transparency on the method 
by which abnormal returns are computed. 
Under the assumption  that markets are efficient and thus  imply that all available information  is 
(directly) incorporated into stock prices, the 11-day period implies that the effects of the event should be 
incorporated into the organizations’ stock prices rather quickly. According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997) and 
MacKinlay (1997) a 11-day event window is general practice and in accordance with the assumption that the 
stock market processes all available information efficiently. The second assumption, stating that the event should 
be unanticipated, is not violated for the reason that the time window includes a t -5 days period, controlling for 
the possibility of a preannouncement drift as a result of information leaked to the market. The third assumption 
that relates  to potential confounding  effects  is  critical for isolation  of the effect of the event of interest 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Based on the limited duration of the 11-day event window it can be argued that it 
is not very likely that the potential abnormal returns will be caused by other events. To ensure the reliability of 
the results though, the study controls for any other events during the 11-day period of selected organizations by 
including a smaller time windows (t = -1 to t = +1). By including the shorter time window, one can be 
reasonably confident that it isolates the abnormal return stemming from the event of interest (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). 
Related to the assumption of confounding effects the comparison between the market reaction after 
publication of an integrated report, an annual report and standalone sustainability report could relate to the 
quality and/ or content of the report published. Admitted that this could severely impact the validity and 
reliability of the results, it should be noted however that ESG aspects are incorporated/ embedded into an 
organizations’ strategy (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; IIRC, 2015a). Given that a strategy will not change continuously, 
one may assume that it is not highly likely that in a period of maximum two years the reporting of ESG aspects 
will significantly differ. 
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4. Findings 
 
– Stock market reaction towards Integrated Reporting – 
 
The current chapter provides the results with regard to the two hypotheses formulated. As the 
character of the hypotheses is such that it did not allow usage of one dataset, the chapter is  
structured by the hypotheses tested. For each hypothesis (sections 4.1 and 4.2) descriptives of the 
data by which it has been tested are provided and results of statistical tests are reported. Each 
section is completed by reporting the extent to which the results found are robust. 
 
 
4.1 Market value of Integrated Reporting 
 
The prediction that Integrated Reporting is valued positively by the stock market is tested by a two-phased 
model. Phase 1 includes the actual event study by which cumulative abnormal returns are calculated (see figure 
3). Although this provides enough evidence for supporting or rejecting the hypothesis, the analysis deepens the 
understanding of the CAR’s by analysing the influence of multiple organization-specific factors on the 
cumulative abnormal returns. Stated differently, phase two provides univariate descriptives of multiple 
organization-specific factors that relate to the CAR’s. 
 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
 
Ev ent window (11 day-period) - CAR 
 
Multiple linear r 
 
 
Clean period 
(3-day period) 
 
-4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 
 
 
t = -105 t = -5 t = 0 t = +5 
 
Figure 3: Schematic overview of the two-phased model for testing H1. 
 
 
4.1.1 Descriptives 
 
In consideration of the descriptive statistics, several observations are noteworthy. First it is noticeable that of the 
organizations having publicly announced to participate in the pilot programme of the IIRC, 50 percent of the 58 
listed organizations made their announcement surrounding the start of the pilot programme (October 2011). 
Since then, approximately one organization per month joined the pilot programme on average, presenting a 
noticeable increase in the first year (2012) following the start of the programme (+15 organizations). Of all the 
announcements made, the majority of the organizations (62%) publicly proclaimed its participation in the fourth 
quarter of that particular year. With regard to the composition of the sample, the participants are dispersed over 
23 countries globally and nine different sectors. Moreover, the descriptive results endorse the recognized 
popularity of Integrated Reporting in Europe (Eccles & Krzus, 2010; KPMG, 2013) as 57 percent of the 
participants are headquartered in Europe, most located in Italy (18%), Spain (18%) and the Netherlands (15%). 
Within the sample, organizations providing financial services are represented strongest (22%), followed by 
industrial organizations (16%) and those processing basic materials (14%). 
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When sorting the data into three time-windows (t = 0, t = -1 to t = +1, and t = -5 to t = +5) it becomes evident 
that the average returns surrounding the announcement substantially differ between organizations as there is 
considerable variation between the extreme values of the range (e.g. -5,33% vs. 9,28%) (see tables 2 and 3 for 
the descriptive statistics). Additionally, it is noticeable that the average returns
9 
fluctuate during the 11 days 
surrounding the announcements (differences over multiple time-windows). Although it seems that under the 
EMH the fluctuation not directly supports the timeliness with which information is reflected in stock prices
10
, it 
is most interesting that the average increase in share price is highest two days after the announcement (2,64%) 
(not reported in the table). 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics sample 1 (in %) – organization’s returns (n = 58) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window Organization-specific factors 
 t  = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 M_cap* CSR_r 
Mean -0,219 0,561 1,344 39.254 63,840 
Median -0,018 0,659 0,316 12.858 64,000 
Std. D. 2,447 3,896 6,584 62.528 5,314 
Min. -5,331 -11,635 -17,100 31 51,000 
Max. 9,277 15,568 18,076 299.614 81,000 
* measured in millions € 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics sample 1 per sector (in %) – organization’s returns (n = 58) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
t = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 
 
Sector n Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. 
Basic materials 8 -0,662 2,576 -0,828 6,641 2,311 11,752 
Consumer goods 7 0,256 1,463 0,996 2,028 0,254 4,339 
Finance 13 -1,139 2,249 0,142 1,939 2,874 6,072 
Health care 2 -0,377 1,591 -0,020 2,519 2,277 10,433 
Industrial 9 -0,914 2,492 -0,057 3,549 -0,293 4,563 
Oil & Gas 7 1,899 3,321 3,480 5,752 3,193 5,977 
Technology 4 1,617 2,472 1,842 2,650 -0,349 2,413 
Telecommunications 2 -1,687 2,387 -2,089 4,281 -3,427 1,278 
Utilit ies 6 -0,305 1,484 0,552 2,769 0,718 7,543 
 
 
 
 
9 
Average increase or decrease of the organization’s share price in respect of the time-window chosen. 
 
10 
Hence, the assumptions underlying the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggest that all information is reflected in stock prices 
rationally and timely (Jensen, 1978; Latif et al., 2012). Therefore one would expect that the average returns are highest at t = 0. 
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4.1.2  Result
s  
 
To adhere to the structure of the analysis, the results for hypothesis one are presented following the phasing of 
the analysis. Hence, section 4.1.2.1 presents the cumulative abnormal returns derived for the sample and each 
sector, followed by section 4.1.2.2 where, by means of univariate descriptives, insight is provided on the 
influence of organization-specific factors on the cumulative abnormal return. 
 
 
4.1.2.1 Cumulative abnormal returns (phase 1) 
 
The standardized abnormal returns are cumulated for each organization separately and for the sample as a whole 
and checked on normality (see appendix A.IV). As the significance of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro- 
Wilk statistics indicate normality, (statistics are significant at 5% level, see also appendix A.IV), the Q-Q plots 
and skewness and kurtosis values support these values, suggesting an acceptable deviation from normality (no 
outliers were removed). Table four presents cumulative abnormal returns for all organizations. Note that the 
CAR’s presented are averaged across all organizations relative to the time-window. The associated t-statistics are 
also included in the table (α = 0,05). Moreover, the actual returns versus expected returns are graphed in figure 4 
(averaged). 
The overall results generally indicate that the announcement with regard to having the intention to adopt 
Integrated Reporting and to contribute to setting the reporting standard is positively received by capital 
providers. Note however that the height of the average cumulative abnormal returns is rather limited and the 
provided t-statistics are not significant at the five percent level. With respect to the latter, the t-statistics imply no 
significant difference between the average cumulative abnormal returns and the average market returns. 
Furthermore, the f-statistics by which inequality of variances is measured, present confirmation of the absence of 
significant differences between the cumulative abnormal returns and market returns. Therefore, the analysis does 
not find solid support for hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Table 4: Average cumulative abnormal returns by time-window and sector (n = 58) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
 
t  = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 
 
All (n = 58) 
(t)
11
 
 
0,203 
(0,845) 
 
0,249 
(0,651) 
 
1,087 
(1,522) 
 
F-test 
(p-value) 
 
2,689 
(0,104) 
 
0,538 
(0,465) 
 
1,001 
(0,319) 
 
 T-statistics that are significance at 5% level are marked with *. 
 Equality of variance between the market return and the AR’s using a F-test are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
T-statistics for the entire sample present the significance of the abnormal returns relative to the market returns and are calculated  
as: t  =  
̄             
(Nieuwenhuis, 2008). Note that the significance of the t-statistics is calculated by a one-tailed test (positive effect is 
   
 
studied). 
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Clean period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: (Organizational) returns vs. expected returns 
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t 0 
 
 
4.1.2.2 Influence of organization-specific factors (phase 2) 
 
The results of the univariate descriptives are presented in table 5. Remarkably, the results do not support the 
work of Banz (1981) unambiguously. Whereas the 11-day CAR indeed provide evidence for the central notion 
that smaller organizations have higher returns, one has to take into account that this effect potentially relate the 
small sample and relatively high betas for the small-cap organizations (β = 0,941 vs. β = 0,819 for the entire 
sample). In addition, the rationale underlying the assumption that higher CSR ratings lead to higher cumulative 
abnormal returns solely applies for the 11 day window. Given the absence of unequivocal evidence, the results 
seem to endorse the findings of Margolis and Walsh (2003), reporting that higher CSR ratings require more 
investments in CSR activities. Thus, as a higher CSR rating relates to higher investment requirements (Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003), the results suggest that capital providers generally do not seem to value highly rated 
organizations more positively. 
 
 
Table 5: Univariate descriptives for M_CAP and CSR_R (n = 58) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
 
M_CAP t  = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 
n Mean Std. D Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
1: Small cap 3 -0,913 3,345 -0,975 1,924  6,432  3,681 
2: Mid cap 20 0,245 1,520 0,323 2,806 -0,054 4,389 
 
3: Large cap 35 0,273 1,878 0,311 3,078 1,280 5,888 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
 
CSR_R t  = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 
n Mean Std. D Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
1: < 60 9 -0,156 1,126 0,376 1,073  2,908  3,488 
2: ≥ 60 to < 65 22 0,770 2,300 0,923 4,146 1,148 6,467 
 
3: ≥ 65 to < 70 22 -0,051 0,999 -0,325 1,677 -0,391 4,922 
 
4: ≥ 70 5 -0,528 2,981 -0,420 2,960 4,221 4,376 
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4.1.3  Robustness of the results  
 
For the reason that the parametric tests indicate that the abnormal returns do not significantly differ from the 
market returns, the study controls for the robustness of this conclusion by performing two non-parametric tests; 
the Mann-Withney/ Wilcoxon test and the more elaborate Kruskal and Wallis test (χ2). Table 6 presents the 
Mann-Withney/ Wilcoxon score and Kruskal and Wallis statistic. For the Mann-Withney/ Wilcoxon statistics, no 
significant results are found, thereby acknowledging the results of the parametric tests that suggest the absence 
of difference between the cumulative abnormal returns and the market returns. Furthermore, the chi-square 
values (Kruskal and Wallis statistic) do not exceed the critical value of 3,84146 (χ2 = 3,84146), providing 
 
additional support for rejecting hypothesis 1. Stated differently, the Mann-Withney/Wilcoxon and Kruskal and 
Wallis test both support the finding of equality between the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement 
regarding Integrated Reporting and the general market returns. 
 
 
Table 6: Mann-Withney/ Wilcoxon test and Kruskal and Wallis test (n = 58) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
 
t  = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 
 
Z-test (Wilcoxon) 
P-value 
 
-1,560 
0,120 
 
-,871 
0,389 
 
-,886 
0,380 
 
χ2 test12 (H-value) 
P-value 
 
3,587 
0,058 
 
2,408 
0,121 
 
0,210 
0,647 
 
 
The absence of significant results and limited height of the cumulative abnormal return could stem from the 
limited sample size, potential information leakage or any misidentification of the announcement dates. 
Furthermore, the study assesses abnormal returns using the capital asset pricing model (market model). Although 
a suitable model for adjusting for risk, it could help explain the height of the cumulative abnormal returns. Note 
that the betas of the studied organizations present relative low volatility in relation to the market (β = 0,819). 
When increasing the betas factitious (average β = 0,919), the average cumulative abnormal returns slightly 
increase by 0,03 percent over the three time-windows
13
. Thus, when using another control group instead of the 
market (assuming higher betas as a result), it would perhaps have a more positive impact on the height of the 
abnormal returns and significance of the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
With the Kruskal and Wallis test one tests the null hypothesis (testing equality of means by using          
  
 ∑          - 3 (n+1). 
  (         ) 
For this study the null hypothesis is stated as H0: There is no difference between abnormal returns and market returns (ranked 
 
data). The Kruskal/Wallis value is compared to the chi-square value of interest (1 Df at the 0,05 level provides a chi-square value 
of 3,841). Thus, if χ2 is greater than 3,841 the null hypothesis is rejected (Nieuwenhuis, 2008; Heij et al., 2004). 
13 
When decreasing the betas factitious (average β = 0,719), suggesting less volatility of the organizations compared 
 
to the market, the average cumulative abnormal returns decrease by 0,02 percent. 
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4.2 Market value of Integrated Reporting versus standalone reporting 
 
As mentioned, Mervelskemper and Streit (2015) and Arnold et al. (2012) argue that one can question if adoption 
of Integrated Reporting, relative to standalone reporting, further increases capital providers’ valuation of the 
organizations’ shares. Although no solid and unambiguous evidence is found for the extent to which Integrated 
Reporting is valued relative to the capital market, the prediction that Integrated Reporting is valued more by 
capital providers than standalone reporting (annual reports and sustainability reports) is assessed by comparing 
the market reaction surrounding the publication of the three reporting mechanisms (see figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Schematic overview of the model for testing H2. 
 
 
4.2.1 Descriptives 
 
As with the first sample, there are a number of descriptive statistics worth mentioning. First, 59 percent of all 
reports are published within the first three months after year end
14 
(65% of the annual reports published, 51% of 
the sustainability reports published, 63% of the integrated reports published). Within this 3-month period, the 
publication of disclosures largely concentrates in the month March, showing 34 percent of the organizations 
making their reports publicly available in that particular month (36 annual reports, 34 sustainability reports and 
37 integrated reports respectively). 
Although most of the types of disclosure are published in the first three months, it is noteworthy though 
that approximately 73 percent of the annual reports are published in advance of standalone sustainability reports. 
Additionally, the period in which sustainability reports are published in general exceeds the publication period of 
integrated reports and annual reports. Accordingly, the results show that within four months after year end 
 
 
14 
Although it is recognized that the fiscal year can differ from the actual calendar, for many organizations in the sample the fiscal 
year equates the calendar. 
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(calendar) 72 percent of the organizations published their sustainability report, relative to 86 and 76 percent of 
the organizations having published their integrated report and annual report respectively. In terms of the 
characteristics of  the  organizations included in the sample,  30 percent can be  classified as multinational 
enterprise (MNE), 69 percent as large organization, and 1 percent as small and medium-sized enterprise (SME). 
As the latter supports the results of Wickert, Scherer, and Spence (2016) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2012), it 
seems to indicate correctness of the presumption that (extended) disclosure requires resources and that such 
resources are more readily available for larger organizations. Additionally, in line with the first sample, Spanish 
and Dutch organizations are highly represented (16% and 10% respectively), complemented by German 
organizations 10%). Here too, financial service organizations are represented strongest (19%), followed by those 
processing basic materials (18%) and organizations operating in the industrial sector. 
Regardless of the quality and content of the reports the preliminary results manifest higher average 
organizational returns over all time-windows when having published an integrated report relative to the returns 
surrounding the publication of an annual report and a standalone sustainability report (t = 0, t = -1 to t = +1, and t 
= -5 to t = +5) (see table 7). Additionally, the minimum values (minimum return) for standalone sustainability 
reports and annual reports are substantially lower than the minimum values for an integrated report (tIR.0 = - 
3,95%, tAR.0 = -8,48% and tSR.0 = -16,80% respectively). The maximum values (maximum return) provide a 
similar depiction as these values are considerably higher for an integrated report (tIR.0 = 14,01%, tSR.0 = 5,51% 
and tSR.0 = 6,24% respectively). On sector level the Oil & Gas sector displays highest average returns at t = 0 for 
integrated reports (3,07%). Moreover, following the negative average returns when announcing the adoption of 
Integrated Reporting, health care organizations present an average negative return of 1,47% at t = 0 when 
publishing an integrated report (see also table 8). 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics sample 2 (in %) – organization’s returns (n = 105) 
 
  
 
 
 
IR 
Announcement 
t  = 0 
AR 
 
 
 
 
SR 
 
 
 
 
IR 
3-day window 
t = -1 to t  = 1 
AR 
 
 
 
 
SR 
 
 
 
 
IR 
11-day window 
t = -5 to t  = 5 
AR 
 
 
 
 
SR 
Mean 
 
0,344 
 
0,021 
 
-0,273 
 
0,163 
 
0,086 
 
-0,335 
 
1,019 
 
0,341 
 
-0,678 
Median 
 
0,020 
 
0,054 
 
-0,109 
 
0,144 
 
0,169 
 
-0,470 
 
-0,384 
 
0,249 
 
-0,233 
Std. D. 
 
2,078 
 
1,865 
 
2,635 
 
3,114 
 
3,932 
 
2,949 
 
6,897 
 
7,228 
 
7,010 
Min. 
 
-3,952 
 
-8,481 
 
-16,802 
 
-8,081 
 
-19,635 
 
-8,923 
 
-12,700 
 
-37,377 
 
-36,102 
Max. 
 
14,101 
 
5,513 
 
6,245 
 
15,799 
 
12,269 
 
8,676 
 
34,382 
 
22,275 
 
30,117 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics sample 2 per sector (in %) – organization’s returns at t = 0 (n = 105) 
 
Announcement t  = 0 
  IR   AR   SR 
Sector n Mean Std. D. Mean  Std. D. Mean Std. D. 
Basic materials 19 0,209 1,420 -0,685  2,304 -1,319 5,034 
Commercial Services 8 0,629 1,570 0,406  1,265 -0,920 0,699 
Consumer goods 10 1,228 1,885 -0,206  1,464 -0,294 1,530 
Finance 19 0,483 1,309 0,133  1,882 0,342 2,519 
Health care 3 -1,469 1,805 0,456  0,760 -0,519 1,290 
Industrial 14 -0,409 1,370 0,386  2,086 -0,311 1,956 
Oil & Gas 6 3,074 5,652 0,449  1,507 -0,211 2,175 
Other 11 0,090 2,244 -0,318  2,851 0,352 0,795 
Technology 3 -0,455 0,397 0,028  0,959 0,874 0,626 
Telecommunications 5 -0,165 1,730 0,386  0,836 -0,284 0,844 
Utilit ies 7 -0,208 1,003 0,497  0,551 0,321 0,923 
Overall 105 0,344 2,078 0,021  1,865 -0,273 2,635 
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
Table nine and figure 6 (page 30) present the comparison of cumulative abnormal returns between the 
publication of integrated reports, annual reports, and standalone sustainability reports for all organizations (n = 
105) and by classification of organizational size (MNE or Large
15
). The cumulative abnormal returns are tested 
 
on normality prior to analysing the significance of the results (see appendix A.V). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk statistics generally present satisfying results (indicating normality). Here too Q-Q plots and 
skewness and kurtosis values are obtained, both indicating no need for data transformation (the deviation from 
normality is acceptable). The cumulative abnormal returns presented in table 9 are averaged across all 
organizations relative to the time-window and type of report published. In addition to the cumulative abnormal 
returns, associated t-statistic (α = 0,05) are reported for the entire sample. Note that the t-statistics indicate the 
significance of the abnormal returns relative to the market returns. 
Seen that there are no control measures for quality and content of the reports incorporated in the 
analysis, it requires certain caution when interpreting the results. As predicted that integrated reports are valued 
more by the stock market than standalone reports (i.e. annual and sustainability reports), the results generally 
seem to suggest that integrated reports do outperform annual reports and standalone sustainability reports in 
terms of market value. It appears that there is a certain degree of stability as the 11-day cumulative abnormal 
returns surrounding the publication of integrated reports are substantially higher than those surrounding the 
publication of an annual report and standalone sustainability reports (at tIR-11 – tAR-11 = 0,96%, at tIR-11 – tSR-11 
= 1,18%). Most striking is that organizations forfeit market value (negative CAR’s) most in the 5-day period 
 
after having published an annual report and a standalone sustainability report, while the same period for 
integrated reports positively contributes to the average cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
 
15 
For the reason that there is only one SME included in the sample, the observation is included in the category “Large”. 
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Although the results present inequality between the reporting mechanisms in terms of absolute average 
cumulative abnormal returns, the significance of the differences is assessed by performing the parametric F-test 
and the non-parametric Kruskal and Wallis test (χ2)16. The f-values and Kruskal and Wallis values (H-values) do 
not provide evidence for rejecting the null hypotheses, indicating that there is no significant difference between 
the average cumulative abnormal returns of the three reporting mechanisms (the null hypothesis is not rejected). 
In conjunction with the remarkably low eta squares (e.g. effect size estimates) by which the variability in the 
ranked scores is accounted for by the type of report, the hypothesis stating that Integrated Reporting is valued 
more by the stock market than standalone reporting (annual reports and sustainability reports) does not find  
significant support
17
. 
 
 
Table 9: Average cumulative abnormal returns by size and  time-window (IR vs. AR and SR) (n = 105) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
 
t  = 0 t  = -1 to t  = 1 t  = -5 to t  = 5 
 
IR AR SR IR AR SR IR AR SR 
 
All (n = 105) 
(t) 
 
0,181 
(1,080) 
 
-0,050 
(-0,285) 
 
-0,204 
(-0,950) 
 
-0,141 
(-0,590) 
 
-0,090 
(-0,272) 
 
-0,419 
(-1,714)
**
 
 
0,311 
(0,462) 
 
-0,654 
(-1,003) 
 
-0,873 
(-1,699)
**
 
Large (72) -0,054 -0,225 -0,272 -0,155 -0,345 -0,556 0,209 -1,051 -0,822 
 
MNE (33) 0,694 0,332 -0,058 -0,110 0,466 -0,122 0,531 0,213 -0,982 
 
F-test (F-value) 
P-value 
1,067 
0,345 
0,419 
0,658 
1,042 
0,354 
 
χ2 test18 (H-value) 
P-value 
 
0,254 
0,881 
 
2,166 
0,339 
 
0,929 
0,628 
 
Effect size estimate19 0,0008 0,0068 0,0029 
 
 T-statistics that are significance at 5% level are marked with *, 10% level are marked with **. 
 P-values for tests of the null hypothesis (no difference), using a F-test and the Kruskal- Wallis test (χ2) are reported. 
 Effect size estimates indicate the extent to which the variability in ranked scores is accounted for by the type of report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
The Kruskal and Wallis test is included for the reason that no outliers were removed from the analysis. Not removing outliers    
from the analysis could impact the normality of data. Therefore, to control for potential deviation from normality, a non - 
parametric test is included. 
17 
No additional post-hoc tests (such as Tukey HSD) are performed given the absence of necessity to determine where the actual 
 
differences are between the groups (IR, AR, SR). Hence, the chi-square statistic is an omnibus statistic. 
18 
With the Kruskal and Wallis test one tests the null hypothesis (testing equality of means by using          
  
 
 
∑          - 3 (n+1). 
  (         ) 
For this study the null hypothesis is stated as H0: There is no difference between the CAR’s of IR, AR, and SR (ranked data). The 
 
Kruskal/Wallis value is compared to the chi-square value of interest (2 Df at the 0,05 level provides a chi-square value of 5,991). 
Thus, if  χ2 is greater than 5,991 the null hypothesis is rejected (Nieuwenhuis, 2008; Heij et al., 2004). 
19 
The effect size estimates (or eta squared) are calculated, dividing the chi-square value by n-1 (n = 314). 
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Clean period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t -5 t -1 t 1 t 5 
t 0 
 
 
Figure 6a: (Organizational) returns vs. expected returns – IR 
 
 
Clean period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t -5 t -1 t 1 t 5 
t 0 
 
 
Figure 6b: (Organizational) returns vs. expected returns – AR 
 
 
 
Clean period 
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Figure 6c: (Organizational) returns vs. expected returns - SR 
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4.2.2.1 Interaction between annual reports and sustainability reports 
 
While the foregoing analysis assessed and compared the market value of each reporting mechanism separately, 
one can argue that the potential anchoring and adjustment bias as mentioned by Barberis and Thaler (2003), 
Rankin et al. (2012) and Orlitzky (2013) is not accounted for. Hence, if capital providers are subject to anchoring 
and adjustment bias, the information provided by the standalone sustainability report should be valued based on 
the already available information in the annual report. Rephrased, if capital providers anchor on their financial 
value assessment, non-financial information potentially will be under or overvalued (Arnold et al., 2012). 
Whereas the interaction effect relates to the under or overvaluation (see figure 7), an additional analysis is 
performed, directly comparing the difference in valuation of an annual report and standalone sustainability report 
to the value of an integrated report (CARSR.t0,3,11 – CARAR.t0,3,11 vs. CARIR.t0,3,11). 
 
 
= -1% 
Overvaluation of financial information or 
undervaluation of non-financial information 
CARIR.t0 = 2% 
 
2% 1% 
 
Time 
 
 
1 2 3 
Anchoring 
AR SR IR 
Sequentiality of publication  
 
Direct comparison of the interaction 
effect between SR and AR and 
CARSR.t0,3,11 – CARAR.t0,3,11 CARIR.t0,3,11 CARIR.t0,3,11 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual overview of additional analysis 
 
 
Based on a subsample of 76 organizations (73%) that follow the required publication sequence (1. AR, 2. SR, 3. 
IR) table 10 presents negative deltas over all time-windows. The results therefore appear to support the reasoning 
of Arnold et al. (2012) suggesting that capital providers undervalue non-financial information or overvalue 
financial information. When assessing the difference between CARSR.t0,3,11 – CARAR.t0,3,11 and the cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the publication of integrated reports (n = 76), the parametric and non-parametric 
tests do not provide concrete evidence for any significant differences between the groups (see table 11). Whereas 
all reported p-values deviate strongly from any significance level, the null hypothesis which states that there is 
no difference between the groups is not rejected. Thus, the results presented provide a certain degree of 
confidence in concluding that Integrated Reporting is not valued more by the stock market than standalone 
reporting. 
 
 
Table 10: Average CARAR, SR incl. SR-AR (n = 76) 
 
  
 
 
 
AR 
Announcement 
t  = 0 
SR 
 
 
 
 
SR-AR 
 
 
 
 
AR 
3-day window 
t = -1 to t  = 1 
SR 
 
 
 
 
SR-AR 
 
 
 
 
AR 
11-day window 
t = -5 to t  = 5 
SR 
 
 
 
 
SR-AR 
Mean 0,010 -0,282 -0,289 0,096 -0,310 -0,406 -0,237 -0,777 -0,541 
Std. D. 1,829 2,465 2,815 3,218 2,663 4,072 6,059 5,748 7,420 
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Table 11: Comparison between CARIR.t0,3,11 and SR-AR.t0,3,11 (n = 76) 
 
Announcement 3-day window 11-day window 
 
  
 
SR-AR 
t  = 0  
 
IR 
 
 
SR-AR 
t  = -1 to t  = 1  
 
IR 
 
 
SR-AR 
t  = -5 to t  = 5  
 
IR 
Mean -0,289  0,102 -0,406 -0,350 -0,541 0,115 
 
F-test  (F-value) 
  
1,009 
   
0,010 
   
0,287 
 
P-value  0,317   0,920   0,593  
 
Z-test (Wilcoxon)  
 
-0,699   
 
-0,269   
 
-0,409  
P-value  0,485   0,788   0,683  
 
χ2 test20   (H-value)  
 
0,196   
 
0,115   
 
0,150  
P-value  0,658   0,735   0,699  
 P-values for tests of the null hypothesis (no difference), using a F-test, Wilcoxon/ Mann-Withney U-test and the Kruskal- Wallis test 
(χ2) are reported. 
 
 
4.2.3      Robustness of the results  
 
Although the parametric and non-parametric significance tests suggest equality of means between the three 
reporting mechanisms and thereby compel not to reject the null hypothesis, the study assesses the robustness of 
this conclusion, controlling for potential type II error (false negative, not rejecting H0 when it is false). Stated 
differently, the probability of type II error is calculated
21 
and should provide confidence for the correctness of the 
decision with regard to not rejecting H0. The probability of a type II error occurring is remarkably low for all 
time windows (β = 0,000 and 0,050, see also table 12). The corresponding power indicates that the risk for a type 
II error is therefore negligible. Thus, in presence of high statistical power (Heij et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis, 2008; 
Lu & White, 2014), it can be argued that the probability of type II error occurring is minimal. The latter 
supports the result that there is no discernible, significant difference between the value of Integrated Reporting 
and more traditional reporting mechanisms. 
Additionally, table 9 and figure 6 present strong fluctuations in terms of excessive returns. The height 
of the cumulative abnormal returns strongly deviates from other event studies (e.g. Cooper et al., 2005). Desp ite 
strict monitoring of the correctness of the procedure, potential explanations underlie the before mentioned 
 
20 
With the Kruskal and Wallis test one tests the null hypothesis (testing equality of means by using          
  
 ∑          - 3 (n+1). 
  (         ) 
For this study the null hypothesis is stated as H0: There is no difference between CARIR.t0,3,11 and SR-AR.t0,3,11 (ranked data (ranked 
 
data). The Kruskal/Wallis value is compared to the chi-square value of interest (1 Df at the 0,05 level provides a chi-square value 
of 3,841). Thus, if χ2 is greater than 3,841 the null hypothesis is rejected (Nieuwenhuis, 2008; Heij et al., 2004). 
21 
The probability of type II error occurring is calculated as: 
 
Z = x - μ 
 
σ/   
 
P (x  ≥ c   Ha) = 1 – β 
 
P (x - μa ≥ c –μa) = 1 – β 
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deviation. Here too holds that the study uses the CAPM, meaning that organizational returns are compared to the 
more general market return. The organizations included in the sample are (on average) theoretically 16% less 
volatile than the market. As the betas indicate that the organizational returns increase/ decrease less than the 
increase/ decrease of the market (lower volatility), it could perhaps have a negative influence on the height of the 
abnormal returns. Hence, the market return is the weighted average of share price developments of all 
organizations listed at the particular market. By including another control group (obtaining other betas) this 
would perhaps have a positive influence on the height of the average cumulative abnormal returns and 
significance of the results. 
 
 
Table 12: Probability of type II Error - Power of rejecting the null hypothesis (values are rounded) 
 
 Announcement 
 
t  = 0 
3-day window 
 
t  = -1 to t  = 1 
11-day window 
 
t  = -5 to t  = 5 
Β (α = 0,05) 0,000 0,000 0,050 
Power (1- β) 0,999 0,999 0,950 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
– Answers and Directions for Future Research – 
 
The final chapter of this thesis amalgamates the findings, providing a concrete answer to the 
problem statement and discussing the theoretical and empirical results obtained (sections 5.1 and 
section 5.2). Additionally, several managerial and academic recommendations are made (sections 
5.3 and 5.4 respectively). 
 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
This thesis opened with recognizing the magnitude of accounting information in relation to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (Jensen, 1978; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Latif et al., 2012; Hoogendoorn & Vergoossen, 2012; Graham 
et al., 2005), agency theory and the extent to which a new reporting mechanism, called Integrated Reporting, is 
expected to bound the information asymmetry between capital providers (principal) and managers (agent) 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Tschopp & Nastanski, 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The rationale for this 
supposition stems from the central tenet that information in an integrated report enhances capital providers’ 
ability to make more effective capital allocation decisions in relation to the information provided by traditional 
reporting mechanisms. Accordingly, one expects that capital providers will positively value organizations that 
have the intention to adopt Integrated Reporting. To empirically test this rationale, the study assessed the extent 
to which the stock market (i.e. capital providers) quantitatively value Integrated Reporting. 
Based on an extensive analysis comprising two event studies, the empirical results do not support the 
general proposition of this study, suggesting that the general acknowledged qualitative benefits of Integrated  
Reporting do not seem to be quantified by capital providers. In perspective of the problem statement this means 
that organizations that have the intention to adopt Integrated Reporting do not significantly outperform the 
market as a whole. That is, no significant differences between the average cumulative abnormal returns and 
market returns can be reported. Furthermore, a comparison of the market value of an annual report, standalone 
sustainability report and an integrated report does not provide significant evidence that the issuance of an 
integrated report further increases the market value of an organization substantially. These results and the 
findings reported by amongst others Mervelskemper and Streit (2015), Arnold et al. (2012) and Stubbs et al. 
(2014) allow one to conclude that Integrated Reporting is not valued superiorly by the stock market and that 
‘One report’ has “not fulfilled its promise quantitatively” (Mervelskemper & Streit, 2015, p. 20). 
 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
In respect of the rationale underlying the first proposition of this study, stating that Integrated Reporting is 
valued positively by the stock market, the results suggest that integrated reports do not diminish the “principal- 
agent problem” and the “lemons problem” that stem from information asymmetry (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & 
Palepu, 1993; Jensen, 1978; Latif et al., 2012). Thus, whereas it was assumed that the qualitative benefits of 
Integrated Reporting such as a better understanding of risks and opportunities and a lower cost of equity capital 
(Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al., 2010; Stubbs & Higgins, 2014) would bound the information asymmetry and in 
turn would be quantified by capital providers positively, the results endorse the findings of Mervelskemper and 
Streit (2015) and Stubbs et al. (2014). One of the potential explanations for not finding support for the rationale 
could encompass the potential presence of strategic incentives of managers to exclude or include information in 
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the disclosure as discussed by Beyer et al. (2010) and Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005). Another potential 
explanation for the results found emanates from the capital provider’s perception of information asymmetry. 
Following Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) one should note from a stewardship perspective that capital 
providers do not seem to perceive an information asymmetry. Although this school of thought significantly 
differs from the agency perspective it endorses the theoretical findings of Jensen (2002) suggesting that the 
shareholder wealth maximization perspective has become obsolete. 
In view of the second proposition of this study, stating that Integrated Reporting is valued more by the 
stock market than standalone Sustainability Reporting, the results provide support for the information economics 
perspective and endorse the findings of Mervelskemper and Streit (2015) and Stubbs et al. (2014). Contradicting 
the findings of Barberis and Thaler (2003), Orlitzky (2013) and Rankin et al. (2012) who plea that users of 
accounting information are subject to anchoring and adjustment bias, the results suggest that identical 
information content leads to identical valuations, regardless of the form in which it is presented. Although the 
latter implicitly assumes that both reporting mechanisms have included identical information, the equality of the 
value of Integrated Reporting and the value of standalone Sustainability Reporting does not point to the presence 
of anchoring and adjustment bias. Rephrased, the results seem to suggest that the simultaneity by which an 
integrated report provides financial and non-financial information is not beneficial over standalone Sustainability 
Reporting in terms of anchoring and adjustment bias and thereby the valuation of the comprehensive report 
(Mervelskemper & Streit, 2015; Stubbs et al., 2014). Note however that the latter needs to be interpreted with a 
certain degree of caution as the study did not include a direct comparison of financial disclosure and non- 
financial disclosure. A direct comparison of the value of these reporting mechanism can lead to other insights. 
 
 
5.3 Recommendations for practitioners 
 
The results presented are of special managerial importance for the reason that Integrated Reporting is still be 
regarded as the next reporting standard (Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Eccles et al., 2010). The quantitative benefits of 
Integrated Reporting, in terms of increased market capitalization, remain indiscernible. Thus, from a market 
valuation perspective this means that organisations do not have an incentive to immediately (announce to) adopt 
Integrated Reporting. As the latter follows Mervelskemper and Streit (2015), it should be noted however that the 
market value of Integrated Reporting is not substantially lower than the market value of standalone Sustainability 
Reporting. Therefore, taking into account that Integrated Reporting has qualitative benefits over other reporting 
mechanisms (Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al., 2010; Stubbs & Higgins, 2014; Higgins et al., 2014; IIRC, 2013), 
organizations are considered prudent when assessing the extent to which the qualitative benefits outweigh the 
resources required to compose an integrated report. 
 
 
5.4 Recommendations for further research 
 
Despite the necessary effort directed at minimizing possible caveats in the research, the study was subject to 
certain limitations that could have biased the results. Therefore, in perspective of theoretical advancement, 
several recommendations could be made that emanate from the study’s limitations and results. First, one should 
recognize that the results largely depend on the researcher’s ability to deduce and determine event dates. It 
logically follows that misinterpretation of event dates is disastrous for isolating a potential effect (MacKinlay, 
1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). One must therefore assure that event dates are correct and no confounding 
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factors interfere the event of interest. Secondly and similarly relating to both samples included in the study, one 
could include a categorical measure for type of capital provider. As discussed by Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, 
and Wright (2010), different types of capital providers evaluate and utilize accounting information differently. 
As Bruton et al. (2010) point to the discrepancy between institutional investors and private inves tors, a study that 
includes a certain measure could isolate the value of Integrated Reporting more effectively. 
For the first sample, the value of Integrated Reporting and the effect of organization-specific factors on 
the cumulative abnormal returns are studied by means of a relatively small sample (n = 58). One interesting 
empirical study may include a lager sample size given that for statistical purposes a larger sample size could 
potentially provide other findings or further support the results presented. Note however that in obtaining a larger 
sample size, the isolation of the intention of organizations to adopt Integrated Reporting requires greatest effort. 
The results through which the second hypothesis is rejected are potentially biased most. In other words, 
the study did not include a measure of reporting quality. Whereas the value of Integrated Reporting and 
standalone reporting is obtained after having published the report, one could not assess if the returns relate to the 
reporting mechanism itself (form of reporting) or to the quality and content of the report. It is therefore highly 
recommended to assess the difference of the market value of the reporting mechanism, by including a quality 
measure. Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley (2004) provide a comprehensive framework that could be used for 
measuring disclosure quality. 
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A.I – Publicly listed organizations (included in the first sample) 
 
Of the 100 organizations participating in the pilot programme of the IIRC, 62 are identified as publicly listed on 
stock exchanges (see table A.I.1) (for the full list of participants, please see the IIRC Yearbook 2013). 
 
 
Table A.I.1: List of publicly listed organizations included in the sample 
 
O rganization Industry Country Ticker 
AB Volvo - Volvo Group Industrial Sweden VOLV-B.ST 
Aegon Group Finance Netherlands AGN.AS 
Akzo Nobel N.V. Basic materials Netherlands AKZA.AS 
ARM Holdings plc Technology United Kingdom ARMH 
Atlantia S.p.A. Industrial Italy ATL.MI 
BBVA Finance Spain BBVA.MC 
Cliffs Natural Resources Basic materials United States of America CLF 
CLP Holdings Limited Utilit ies China 0002.HK 
DANONE Consumer goods France BN.PA 
Diesel & Motor Engineering PLC Industrial Sri Lanka DIMO.N0000 
EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG Utilit ies Germany EBK.DE 
Enel Utilit ies Italy ENEL.MI 
eni S.p.A. Oil & Gas Italy ENI.MI 
Gold Fields Basic materials The Republic of South Africa GFI 
HSBC Holdings plc Finance United Kingdom HSBA.L 
Marks and Spencer Group plc Consumer goods United Kingdom MKS.L 
Microsoft Corporation Technology United States of America MSFT 
National Australia Bank Limited Finance Australia NABZY 
Novo Nordisk Health care Denmark NOVO-B.CO 
Prudential Financial, Inc. Finance United States of America PRU 
Randstad Holding N.V. Industrial Netherlands RAND.AS 
Stockland Finance Australia SGP.AX 
Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited Health care Japan TKPYY 
The Coca-Cola Company Consumer goods United States of America KO 
Vestas Wind Systems Oil & Gas Denmark VWS.CO 
AngloGold Ashanti Basic materials South Africa AU 
BASF SE Basic materials Germany BAS.DE 
Masisa SA Basic materials Chile SCL: CL:MASISA 
Solvay Basic materials Belgium SOLB.BR 
Teck resources Basic materials Canada TCK-B.TO 
The Clorox Company Consumer goods United States of America CLX 
Industria de Diseno Textil SA Consumer goods Spain ITX.MC 
Unilever Consumer goods United Kingdom ULVR.L 
Achmea (former Eureko) Finance Netherlands ANAF.AS 
Deutsche Borse Group Finance Germany DB1.DE 
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Itau Unibanco Finance Brazil ITUB4.SA 
Interserve Plc Industrial United Kingdom IRV.L 
Petrobras SA Oil & Gas Brazil PETR4.SA 
Rosneft Oil & Gas Russian Federation ROSN.ME 
SNAM SpA Oil & Gas Italy SRG.MI 
Indra Technology Spain IDR.MC 
SAP Technology Germany SAP.DE 
SK Telecom Telecommunications South Korea 017670.KS 
Tata Steel Industrial India TATASTEEL.NS 
BAM Group Industrial Netherlands BAMNB.AS 
Terna SpA Utilit ies Italy TRN.MI 
Jones Lang LaSalle Finance United States of America JLL 
AES Brazil Utilit ies Brazil GETI4.SA 
ENAGAS SA Utilit ies Spain ENG.MC 
Sasol Oil & Gas South Africa SSL 
Repsol SA Oil & Gas Spain REP.MC 
Telefonica SA Telecommunications Spain TEF.MC 
Deutsche Bank Finance Germany DBK.DE 
Generali Group Finance Italy G.MI 
DBS Bank Finance Singapore MU7.SI 
CCR SA Industrial Brazil CCRO3.SA 
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Industrial South Korea 000720.KS 
Sainsbury's Consumer goods United Kingdom SBRY.L 
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A.II  – Examples Announcement participation IIRC pilot programme 
 
 
Announcement Unilever 
 
 
 
Source :        http://inte grate dr ep orti ng .org/ne w s/u nile ver -link s-w ith- oth er -global -b usin ess-lea d ers-in-the 
 
-international-integrated-reporting-councils-pilot-programme/ 
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Announcement Deutsche Boerse Group 
 
 
 
Source :        http://inte grate dr epo rting. org/ne w s/d eutsc he -borse -g roup -be co me s-the -100th -business-to-join-ii rc - pilot-
programme/ 
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Announcement Eni 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :       http://w w w .eni .c om/e n_ IT/sustaina bil ity/pa ge s/20 11/pilot -p rog ram m e-i i rc .shtm l 
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A.III  - Publicly listed organizations (included in the second sample) 
 
The 3.314 recognized integrated reports are published by 1.547 organizations globally (based on the IIRC 
database and GRI database). 42% of the publishing organizations is located in Europe (see table A.III.1). 
 
 
Table A.III.1: organizations by region 
 
Region Total  % 
Africa 350 23% 
Asia 186 12% 
Europe 645 42% 
Latin America & the Caribbean 205 13% 
Northern America 69 4% 
Oceania 92 6% 
Totals 1547 100% 
 
Approximately 59% (911) of the organizations having published an integrated report is publicly listed and 
scattered over 6 regions (see table A.III.2) and 42 sectors (industry classes). 
 
 
 
Figure A.III.1: Organizations by region (chart) 
 
 
Table A.III.2: listed organizations by region 
 
Region Total  % 
Africa 286 31% 
Asia 146 16% 
Europe 299 33% 
Latin America & the Caribbean 106 12% 
Northern America 39 4% 
Oceania 35 4% 
Totals 911 100% 
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The 299 European, publicly listed, organizations are scattered over 22 countries (see table A.III.3) and 34 sectors 
(industry classes). 35% (105) of the organizations just mentioned are included in the sample for the reason that 
these organizations meet the criteria of having published a standalone sustainability report prior of having 
published an integrated report (see table A.III.4). 
 
 
 
Figure A.III.2: Listed organizations by region (chart) 
 
 
Table A.III.3: European, listed organizations by country 
 
Region Country Total  
Europe  Austria 14 
 Belgium 10 
 Croatia 1 
 Denmark 5 
 Finland 33 
 France 16 
 Germany 19 
 Greece 5 
 Hungary 3 
 Ireland 1 
 Italy 11 
 Luxembourg 1 
 Netherlands 31 
 Norway 11 
 Poland 5 
 Portugal 7 
 Russian Federation 14 
 Slovenia 2 
 Spain 39 
 Sweden 23 
 Switzerland 28 
 United Kingdom 20 
Totals  299 
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Table A.III.4: Organizations included in the second sample are listed below. 
 
O rganization Industry Country Ticker 
A.P. Møller - Mærsk Conglomerates Denmark MAERSK-B.CO 
Abengoa Conglomerates Spain ABG.MC 
Accenture Spain Commercial Services Spain ACN 
AEGON Financial Services Netherlands AEG 
Aeroports de Paris (ADP) Aviation France ADP.PA 
Ahlstrom Corporation Forest and Paper Products Finland AHL1V.HE 
Altran Commercial Services Spain ALT.PA 
Amadeus Commercial Services Spain AMS.MC 
AstraZeneca Healthcare Products United Kingdom AZN.L 
Atlas Copco Equipment Sweden ATCO-A.ST 
Atos Computers France ATO.PA 
Atresmedia Media Spain A3M.MC 
AXA Financial Services France CS.PA 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Financial Services Italy BMPS.MI 
Banco Espirito Santo Financial Services Portugal BES.LS 
Banco Sabadell Financial Services Spain SAB.MC 
Bank Coop Financial Services Switzerland BC.SW 
BANKIA Financial Services Spain BKIA.MC 
Bankinter Financial Services Spain BKT.MC 
Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank Financial Services Switzerland BLKB.SW 
Bayer AG Conglomerates Germany BAYN.DE 
Berkeley Group Real Estate United Kingdom BKG.L 
Berner Kantonalbank Financial Services Switzerland BEKN.SW 
Boliden Mining Sweden BOL.ST 
BONDUELLE SAS Food and Beverage Products France BON.PA 
Bpost Logistics Belgium BPOST.BR 
BT Group Telecommunications United Kingdom BT-A.L 
Componenta Metals Products Finland CTH1V.HE 
Conwert Real Estate Austria CWI.VI 
Corinth Pipeworks Other Greece SOLK.AT 
Delta Lloyd Financial Services Netherlands DL.AS 
Diageo Food and Beverage Products United Kingdom DGE.L 
DNB NOR Financial Services Norway DNB.OL 
DSM Chemicals Netherlands DSM.AS 
EDP (Energias de Portugal) Energy Utilities Portugal EDPFY 
EnBW AG Energy Utilities Germany EBK.DE 
Endesa Energy Utilities Spain ELE.MC 
Energiedienst Energy Utilities Switzerland EDHN.SW 
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Eni S.P.A. Energy Italy ENI.MI 
Ericsson Telecommunications Sweden ERIC-B.ST  
Fluidra Other Spain FDR.MC 
Fomento de Construcciones Y Contratas Construction Spain FCC.MC 
Fonciere Des Regions Real Estate France FDR.PA 
Fortum Energy Finland FUM1V.HE 
Fraport AG Aviation Germany FRA.DE 
G4S plc Other United Kingdom GFS.L 
GDF Suez Energy Utilities France ENGI.PA 
Geberit  Construction Materials Switzerland GEBN.VX 
Grupo ACS Construction Spain ACS.MC 
Grupo Banco Popular Financial Services Spain POP.MC 
Heijmans Construction Netherlands HEIJM 
Heineken N.V. Food and Beverage Products Netherlands HEIA.AS 
Henkel Household and Personal Products Germany HEN3.DE 
HHLA (Hamburger Hafen und Logistik) Logistics Germany HHFA.DE 
HOCHTIEF Aktiengesellschaft Construction Germany HOT.DE 
HOLOGRAM INDUSTRIES Other France HOL 
Hufvudstaden AB Real Estate Sweden HUFV-A.ST 
Iberdrola Energy Utilities Spain IBE.MC 
ING Group Financial Services Netherlands INGA.AS 
International Personal Finance Financial Services United Kingdom IPF.L 
Italcementi Group Construction Materials Italy IT .MI 
Johnson Matthey Chemicals United Kingdom JMAT.L 
K+S-Gruppe Chemicals Germany SDF.DE 
KBC Group Financial Services Belgium KBC.BR 
Kemira Chemicals Finland KRA1V.HE 
Kesko Corporation Retailers Finland KESAV.HE 
Kongsberg Conglomerates Norway KOG.OL 
KPN Telecommunications Netherlands KPN.AS 
Kuoni Tourism/Leisure Switzerland KUNN.SW 
Lafarge Construction Materials France LHN.PA 
Lonmin Mining United Kingdom LMI.L 
MCH Group Other Switzerland MCGN.SW 
Meliá Hotels International Tourism/Leisure Spain MEL.MC 
Millennium Banco Comercial Português Financial Services Portugal BCP.LS 
Mota-Engil SGPS Construction Portugal EGL.LS 
Nordnet Financial Services Sweden NN-B.ST 
OutoKumpu Metals Products Finland OUT1V.HE 
Pirelli Conglomerates Italy PCP.MI 
PKN Orlen Energy Poland PKY1.MU 
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Puma Textiles and Apparel Germany PUM.DE 
Realia Real Estate Spain RLIA.MC 
Reckitt  Benckiser Household and Personal Products United Kingdom RB.L 
REN - Redes Energéticas Nacionais Energy Utilities Portugal RENE.LS 
Roto Smeets Group Media Netherlands VNC.AS 
Royal BAM Group Construction Netherlands BAMNB.AS 
Royal Wessanen Food and Beverage Products Netherlands WES.AS 
Sacyr Vallehermoso Construction Spain SCYR.MC 
Saint-Gobain Construction Materials France SGO.PA 
SAP Other Germany SAP.DE 
Siemens Conglomerates Germany SIE.DE 
SOLVAY s.a. Chemicals Belgium SOLB.BR 
Sonae Sierra Real Estate Portugal SON.LS 
Sponda Real Estate Finland SDA1V.HE 
Stora Enso Forest and Paper Products Finland STERV.HE 
Symrise AG Chemicals Germany SY1.DE 
Tamro Group Healthcare Services Finland PNHX.L 
Tatneft Energy Russian Federation TATN.ME 
Telecom Italia Telecommunications Italy TIT.MI 
TeliaSonera Telecommunications Sweden TLSN.ST 
The Linde Group Energy Germany LIN.DE 
TITAN CEMENT Construction Materials Greece TITK.AT 
UCB Healthcare Products Belgium UCB.BR 
Unicredit Financial Services Italy UCG.MI 
Uralkali Chemicals Russian Federation URKA.ME 
Vestas Windsystems A/S Other Denmark VWS.CO 
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A.I V  – Normality of the cumulative abnormal returns – Sample 1 
 
 
Table A.IV.1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk values for CAR’s sample 1 
 
Tests of Normality 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 
   
Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
T  = 0 ,130 58 ,017 ,860 58 ,000 
3-day ,142 58 ,005 ,884 58 ,000 
11-day ,132 58 ,013 ,956 58 ,035 
 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.IV.1: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for t = 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.IV.2: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 3-day window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.IV.3: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 11-day window 
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A.V  – Normality of the cumulative abnormal returns – Sample 2 
 
 
Table A.V.1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk values for CAR’s sample 2 
 
Tests of Normality 
   
 
Statistic 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
Statistic 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. 
 Group      
T = 0 IR  
,119 
 
105 
 
,001 
 
,856 
 
105 
 
,000 
 AR  
,146 
 
105 
 
,000 
 
,873 
 
105 
 
,000 
 SR  
,194 
 
105 
 
,000 
 
,636 
 
105 
 
,000 
3-day IR  
,119 
 
105 
 
,001 
 
,934 
 
105 
 
,000 
 AR  
,135 
 
105 
 
,000 
 
,871 
 
105 
 
,000 
 SR  
,063 
 
105 
 
,200* 
 
,988 
 
105 
 
,438 
11-day IR  
,137 
 
105 
 
,000 
 
,898 
 
105 
 
,000 
 AR  
,099 
 
105 
 
,013 
 
,915 
 
105 
 
,000 
 SR  
,078 
 
105 
 
,120 
 
,939 
 
105 
 
,000 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Figure A.V.1a: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for t =o - IR 
 
 
 
Figure A.V.1b: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for t =o - AR 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.V.1c: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for t =o - SR 
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Figure A.V.2a: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 3-day window - IR 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.V.2b: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 3-day window - AR 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.V.2c: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 3-day window - SR 
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Figure A.V.3a: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 11-day window - IR 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.V.3b: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 11-day window - AR 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.V.3c: Histogram and normal Q-Q plot for 11-day window - SR 
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